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Introduction

It has been said that the principle against twice punishing an individual for the
same crime is as old as the common law itself.1 The roots of the principle can be
traced back to Roman law and ancient biblical law. It has long been part of English
common law and first received constitutional recognition in the form of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Indeed it has been recognized at
national level, in some form or other, across the globe.
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The principle has been recognized at a national level among almost all common law
countries, either by incorporation into their constitutions or by incorporation into
statutory law.2 The non bis in idem principle has found a home in at least fifty
constitutions3 including countries such as Canada,4 New Zealand,5 South Africa6 and
India.7 There are vastly different approaches however, with some systems prohibiting
successive prosecutions for the same conduct after an acquittal or conviction and
others permitting further trials where there are newly discovered facts or where there
has been a fundamental defect in the earlier trial. Others permit repeated prosecutions
but prohibit double punishment.

The double jeopardy principle, as it is known in the United States, is intimately
related to non bis in idem (from the Latin maxim nemo bis vexari pro una et eadam
causa meaning ‘a man shall not be twice vexed or tried for the same cause’).
Although conceptually similar, the primary difference between double jeopardy and
non bis in idem is that double jeopardy operates only within a single legal system
while the identity of the prosecuting power is not relevant to the application of non
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bis in idem.8 Non bis in idem relates to numerous issues including; the recharging of
an accused with the same or another offence, the framing of an indictment, the
sentencing of an accused on multiple convictions (double punishment), new trials,
appeals, revision, the relationship between courts and between states.9

The principle of non bis in idem plays a fundamentally important role within the
criminal justice system.

Its rationale lies principally in the need to protect

individuals, with their limited access to resources, from being harassed through
repeated prosecutions by the powerful state, with its access to extensive resources.10
It prevents the state from attempts to retry facts underlying an acquittal11 thereby
limiting erroneous convictions which could flow from the fact that defendants do not
have the resources and energy to fight against repeated and vexatious prosecutions.
Non bis in idem protects individuals against multiple punishments for the same
offence, so-called double counting, in the absence of authorization by the legislature.
The common law articulation of the principle, which may be traced to Sir William
Blackstone, conceived of double jeopardy in relation to procedural and substantive
blameworthiness, i.e. the need to avoid multiple punishment of a single act of
blameworthy and criminal conduct.12
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In addition, non bis in idem operates to bring criminal proceedings to finality, and
is therefore of benefit to the defendant as well as to society. Furthermore, it operates
to uphold the integrity of the administration of justice by limiting conflicting judicial
rulings. However, it must be tempered by the need to bring criminals to justice and to
punish them.

Non bis in idem operates at three levels; firstly, it operates in relation to multiple
prosecutions within a state (internal application).

Secondly, it operates between

different sovereigns (first-tier international application). Thirdly, it operates with
respect to relations between states and international tribunals (second-tier
international application). At an international level, the nature of transnational crimes
and the applicable jurisdictional principles13 could leave defendants at risk of
prosecution for international crimes by a number of sovereigns, as well international
criminal tribunals.

This paper will analyze the formulation of the principle in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court14 (hereafter “the Rome Statute”) and speculate on the
level of protection it will afford to defendants indicted for international crimes. The
first part of the paper will look at the national application of non bis in idem,
particularly looking at the United States. The second part gives a brief overview of
13
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the principle in its international context. The third part looks, very cursorily, at the
events in East Timor and Cambodia, to better understand the context for the certain
provisions in the text of the Rome Statute. The fourth section looks specifically at the
text of the Rome Statute.

Part I: Double Jeopardy and the Fifth Amendment

The United States Constitution Fifth Amendment famously declares “…nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice out in jeopardy of life or
limb…” At first glance this appears simple and straight forward. It appears to protect
individuals against being placed at risk of further punishment, through further
criminal proceedings in relation to the same offence, following an acquittal or
conviction. However, this apparent simplicity is deceiving. To begin with the courts
must determine when they are dealing with the same offence for the purposes of the
Fifth Amendment.

The Supreme Court has been anything but consistent in its

development of a proper theory.

In Diaz v United States15 the Supreme Court stated: “The homicide charged
against the accused in the Court of First Instance and the assault and battery for which
he was tried before the justices of the peace, although identical in some of their
elements, were distinct offenses in both law and fact…the justice of the peace,
although possessed of jurisdiction to try the accused or assault and battery, was
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without jurisdiction to try him for homicide…It follows that the plea of former
jeopardy disclosed no obstacle to the prosecution for homicide”

In Diaz therefore same offence meant the same offence. However, this was
followed by Blockburger v United States.16 The defendant had been charged and
convicted of two offences, viz. selling drugs without the original packaging and
selling drugs without a written order, both violations of Harrison Narcotic Act. The
Supreme Court considered the proposition that the separate indictments violated the
protection against double jeopardy and held that the defendant could be indicted with
two offences because each required proof of an additional element not required by the
other. Under Blockburger a greater offense is generally treated as the same offense as
each of its lesser included offenses. The Blockburger test has often been critiqued by
commentators because, when rigidly applied, it leads to inequitable and absurd
results.17 Applying Blockburger, attempted murder must be treated as being the same
offence as premeditated murder. Although the Blockburger test was not formulated
by reference to successive prosecutions, it was subsequently applied in those
circumstances.18

In Brown v Ohio19 the defendant had been charged and convicted, in the county
where he was apprehended, of joyriding. Subsequently, in a different county, he was
indicted for autotheft.
16
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included offence because auto theft required proof of joyriding (as well as proof that
the accused intended to permanently deprive the owner of possession of the vehicle).
Accordingly, the auto theft indictment was impermissible.

Grady v Corbin20 marked a shift from Blockburger.

The accused had been

convicted of driving while intoxicated and failing to keep to his lane, a traffic
violation. When it later came to light that the victim of the accident, caused by the
defendant’s traffic violation, had died from his injuries, the defendant was charged
and convicted of manslaughter, reckless homicide and drunken driving. On appeal,
the Supreme Court articulated the test as follows: a second prosecution may not be
held “if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that [second]
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offence of which
the defendant has already been prosecuted”.21 Accordingly, Court found that the
accused should not be placed in further jeopardy for manslaughter, reckless homicide
or drunken driving.

In United States v Dixon22 the Supreme Court returned to the Blockburger test.
Here, two defendants had been convicted of contempt of court for violating courts
orders, which barred them from committing offences on their release from custody.
They were then prosecuted for the same conduct to which the court orders related.
The Supreme Court ruled that, because two of the offences contained the exact same
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elements as the contempt charge, these charges could not survive the double jeopardy
prohibition.

The brief sample of the Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates an
inconsistent conception of the double jeopardy protection, at times the approach is
broader and other times more limited than is warranted.

Although the double

jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment limits the government to one bite at the
cherry, very little else is clear. The Court should be faithful to the constitutional text.
The double jeopardy clause was clearly intended to relate only to same offences.
This is consistent with the historical development of the double jeopardy protection.23
By enquiring into the elements of the offenses and by trying to establish whether the
proof of one offence necessarily required proof of another, the Court has run into
massive interpretive problems. Lenient treatment of auto theft and manslaughter does
not serve the interests of justice.

There is no sound legal argument or policy

justification why prior convictions for lesser-included offenses should bar subsequent
prosecutions for the greater offense.

As the Court discovered, double jeopardy

pertinently raises the question of appropriate levels of deference to the Legislature (in
regard to its role in creating offences) but easy solutions are elusive.

In respect of multiple prosecutions, the rules of the game are somewhat clearer.
The general rule is that acquittals, whether by a jury or court, based on the
insufficiency of the evidence presented, are not capable of being appealed by the
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state.24 Whether acquittal verdicts result from error is immaterial, the defendant must
not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence.25 A second prosecution of the
same offence is however permissible when a convicted defendant has successfully set
aside his conviction on grounds other than the insufficiency of the evidence.26 On the
assumption that there is a “continuing jeopardy” until final judgment, mistrials
justified by “manifest necessity” may be followed by a second trial27 even if the
mistrial resulted from an innocent procedural error by the prosecutor.28 However,
mistrials caused by the defendant or granted at the defendant’s request do not prohibit
a retrial.29

The double jeopardy protection is limited by the dual sovereignty doctrine. The
doctrine, set out in United States v Lanza30 establishes that the double jeopardy
clause does not bar prosecutions for the same offense at state and federal level. The
Court stated “ “we have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory…It
follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an
offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each”.31 The
Supreme Court has also confirmed that, because states are equally sovereign, a
defendant convicted under the laws of one state may be indicted under the laws of
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another state for the same offence.32 Furthermore, the dual sovereignty approach also
operates in respect of sequential foreign and federal prosecutions.33 Although the socalled “sham exception”34 limits further prosecutions by different sovereigns if the
second prosecution is a cover for a prosecution by the first sovereign, who failed at its
first attempt, this is a limited and narrow exception.

Under English common law, there is an absolute bar against indicting a defendant
for the same offence twice if the accused has been acquitted or convicted. This
absolute prohibition is now subject to a statutory exception, in the form of the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (1996), where acquittals are tainted by
interference with or intimidation of jurors and witnesses.35 Artefois acquit/convict
applies only when the offences in the first and second prosecutions are identical in
fact and law. Unlike the dual sovereignty approach of the United States, there is a
long line of authority which indicates that the English courts will not try defendants
who have already been tried by foreign courts with competent jurisdiction for the
same offences.36

English common law provides that, subject to a few limited

exceptions, the prosecution has no right of appeal.37 In 1998 the United Kingdom
passed the Human Rights Act which incorporates the [European] Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms38 (the European
Convention). It remains to be seen how the common law defenses of atrefois acquit
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and atrefois convict will be influenced by Additional Protocol 7 to the European
Convention39 when it ratifies the Protocol.40

Part II: Non bis In Idem in the International Context

Although commentators argue that the internal application of non bis in idem has
achieved the status of customary international law, all agree that its application as
between different sovereigns, or as between nations and international courts, is less
entrenched or developed.41 Apart from extradition law42 most commentators agree
that the international application of non bis in idem cannot be considered customary
international law nor can it be considered a general principle of international law.

At an international level, the application of non bis in idem is hindered by several
factors, principally the fact that: (a) recognition of foreign criminal judgments is a
limitation of sovereignty43 (b) there are wide disparities in respect of its
implementation at national level44 (c) recognition of foreign criminal judgments, or
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judgments of international courts, require a high degree of faith in the administration
of justice by the other jurisdictions.45 Below, the relevant aspects of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights46 (hereafter “the ICCPR”) the European
Convention and the Convention on Schengen47 (hereafter “the Schengen
Convention”) are briefly discussed.

Non Bis In Idem in Multilateral Treaties

Article 14(7) of the ICCPR provides that: “No one shall be liable to be tried or
punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or
acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country”

In 1984 the United Nations Human Rights Committee (hereafter “the HRC”)
published its views on article 14(7) of the ICCPR. The HRC noted in General
Comment 13 that states have expressed differing views on the resumption of criminal
cases and some have felt it necessary to make reservations in that respect. The HRC
noted that most states distinguish between the resumption of a trial in exceptional
circumstances and the prohibition of a re-trial under the principle of double jeopardy.

At the outset it should be noted that article 14(7) refers to final conviction and
final acquittal. Thus double jeopardy does not enter into the picture until final
is to prohibit appeals by prosecutors against acquittals or light sentences whereas the civil tradition
generally contains no such bar and the state may appeal acquittals due to errors of law or errors of fact.
45
Note 41, 318
46
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47
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judgment is delivered.

The textual formulation therefore permits a second

prosecution or trial pending a final judgment under the law or penal procedure of the
state concerned. By specifically referring to the laws and penal procedures of each
country, the formulation of article 14(7) lends itself to a narrow application in that it
does not prevent prosecutions for the same offence by different sovereigns, a dual
sovereignty approach. This was affirmed by the HRC in AP v Italy.48 AP had been
convicted of conspiring to illegally exchange currency in Switzerland.

He was

sentenced to two years imprisonment, after which he was expelled from the country.
Italy indicted him for the same offence and asked France to extradite him so that he
could stand trial in Italy. France refused but Italy convicted him in absentia. AP
referred an individual complaint to the HRC alleging that Italy sought to violate his
right against double jeopardy. The HRC ruled that the complaint was inadmissible
because article 14(7) prohibited double jeopardy only in regard to adjudication within
a given state.

In Jijon v Ecuador49 the HRC was again asked to consider article 14(7). In this
case, the complainant submitted that his right, not to be subjected to double jeopardy,
was violated by Ecuador. He had been convicted of participating in a bank robbery
and served a one year prison sentence. Upon his release he was charged for the
unlawful possession of firearms during the bank robbery. However, the Ecuadorian
Superior Court had dismissed the charges. Jijon argued that his right not to be
subjected to double jeopardy had been violated. The HRC held that there was no

48
49

AP v Italy Communication 204/1986 (16 July 1986)
Jijon v Ecuador Communication No. 277/1998: Ecuador 08/04/92

14
violation declaring that “while the second indictment concerned a specific element of
the same matter examined in the initial trial, Mr Teran was not tried or convicted a
second time, since the Superior Court had quashed the indictment, thus vindicating
the principle of ne bis in idem”.

The European Convention makes no express reference to non bis in idem but
article 4(1) of Additional Protocol 7 to the European Convention declares that “No
one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the
jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally
acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.”
However, article 4(2) makes specific provision to re-open a case in accordance with
national laws if there are new or newly discovered facts or if there has been serious
defect in the previous proceedings, which could have affected the outcome of the
case.

Article 4(2) is also flexible enough to accommodate different domestic

approaches. The sub-article provides that the principle does not in any way limit the
right of convicted persons to re-open of the case in circumstances permitted under
national law.

In Oliveira v Switzerland,50 the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter “the
ECHR”) considered article 4 of Additional Protocol 7 and took a narrower view than
it previously had in Gradinger v Austria.51 Oliveira had been driving on a snow
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covered road and was unable to control her vehicle because she had not adjusted her
speed. The vehicle veered into another car and caused injuries to the occupant of that
vehicle. The police magistrate fined her for violating the Road Traffic Act, by failing
to drive safely and control her vehicle. She was subsequently fined by the district
court for negligently causing physical injury to the occupant of the other vehicle. The
ECHR held that article 4 did not prohibit people from being tried twice for the
different offences arising from the same set of facts.

Apart from extradition treaties, there have been few attempts to establish the
international application of the non bis in idem principle (i.e. preventing state Y from
conducting further prosecutions following a prosecution for the same offence by state
X). Early attempts to do so in Europe failed.52 These were followed by the Schengen
Convention which has been more successful, with at least ten member states.53

Article 54 of the Schengen Convention provides that “A person whose trial has
been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in another
Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it
has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be
enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party.” However, article 55
builds in several exceptions which contracting states may adopt in relation to article

with excess alcohol in his blood system. The ECHR noted that the offences were different but found that
article 4 had been violated because both charges were based on the same conduct.
52
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into force July 26, 1974) and the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters
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53
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54. The first exception relates to instances where the acts to which the foreign
judgment relates occurred in whole or in part on its own territory. The second
exception relates to instances where the acts, to which the foreign judgment relates,
constitute an offence against the national security or other equally important interests
of that contracting party.

International Criminal Tribunals

The London Charter of 1945 established the legal basis for the punishment of
Nazi war criminals, however the nuts and bolts for the trials of the major war
criminals were provided by article 11 of the Constitution of the International Military
Tribunal (hereafter the IMT”). Article 11 provided that “Any person convicted by the
Tribunal may be charged before a national, military or occupation court…with a
crime other than of membership in a criminal group or organization and such court
may, after convicting him, impose upon him punishment independent of and
additional to the punishment imposed by the IMT for participation in the criminal
activities of such group or organization.”

Clearly this was an extremely weak

formulation of the non bis in idem principle.54 Although the IMT55 occasionally
made statements to articulate their respect for the principle of non bis in idem there
was in fact little real concern for the principle.56

54
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The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter “the ICTR”)
established by Security Court Resolution 955 (1994) incorporated the non bis in idem
principle in article 9,57 as did article 10 of the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter “the ICTY”) established by Security
Council resolution 827 (1993).58 In the Tadic case, the defense claimed a violation of
non bis in idem because proceedings on the same indictment had already commenced
against him in Germany.59 The Trial Chamber dismissed the claim on the grounds
that “the accused has not yet been the subject of a judgment on the merits of any of
the charges for which he has been indicted”

60

However the ICTY did hold that

Germany, which had deferred the case to the ICTY, could not again prosecute Tadic
for the same facts after the disposition of his case at the ICTY.61
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ordinary crime; or (b) The national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to
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58
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60
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61
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As mentioned earlier, non bis in idem is relevant also when defendants face
multiple convictions which may arise from their indictment for several crimes with
overlapping elements.

War crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, for

example, contain overlapping elements. In these instances, it is important for the
prosecutor to avoid a multiplicity of charges relating to the same conduct. However,
in the absence of guidelines as to which crimes deserve the priority, this is not an easy
task.62 Although the ICTY rejected the notion of ranking international crimes, the
ICTR has been more receptive to the idea.63 However, neither the ICTY nor the
ICTR has expressly provided for the ranking of international crimes in their
constitutive documents.

Although the jurisprudence of the ICTR and the ICTY has not been uniform, both
ad hoc tribunals took the approach that cumulative charges phrased in the alternative
are permissible if the same conduct contravenes more than one criminal provision.
The tribunals took the view that potential unfairness to the accused should be
addressed at the sentencing stage. This was explained by the Appeal Chamber in
Celebici: “Cumulative charging is to be allowed in light of the fact that, prior to the
presentation of all of the evidence, it is not permissible to determine to a certainty
which of the charges brought against the accused will be proven. The Trial Chamber
is better poised, after the parties’ presentation of the evidence, to evaluate which of
the charges may be retained, based upon the sufficiency of the evidence. In addition,

62

A. Bogdan “Cumulative Charges, Convictions and Sentencing at the Ad Hoc International Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda” 3 Melb. J. Int’l L. 1 2002, 5
63
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cumulative charging constitutes the usual practice of both this Tribunal and the
ICTR.”64

Though cumulative charges may be permissible if they are phrased in the
alternative, whether cumulative convictions are justifiable is another matter.

In

Akayesu the Trial Chamber took the view that multiple convictions for the same
conduct is not permissible when one offence is the lesser included offence of the
other or when one offence charges the accused as an accomplice and the other
charges the accused as the principal offender.

In the Celebici case, the Appeal

Chamber stated that multiple convictions based on the same set of proven facts has on
occasion “been upheld, with potential issues of unfairness to the accused being
addressed at the sentencing phase”.65

The jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR both demonstrate an inclination to
adopt the same elements test espoused by Blockburger. 66 As Bogdan points out, this
may adversely impact on defendants’ rights. Defendants face the possibility of being
convicted on multiple charges for the same conduct and then run the risk of being
twice punished for the same conduct. Even if sentences for cumulative convictions
run concurrently there are other potential inequities for the defendant. Firstly, there
are inevitable stigmas that attach to cumulative convictions. Secondly, cumulative
convictions may adversely affect the possibility of early release. Finally, defendants
will be adversely affected by habitual offender laws if they are subsequently
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convicted in different jurisdictions.67 For these reasons, the proposition that multiple
convictions should only be permissible if the offences are “genuinely distinct” (to be
determined by the nature of the conduct and not the elements of the offence) is
persuasive.

The ICTY and the ICTR was based on the principle that the ad hoc tribunals
would exercise concurrent jurisdiction, although the ad hoc tribunals were be granted
primacy of jurisdiction. These tribunals had wide powers to intervene at any stage of
national proceedings and request the state to defer the matter to the tribunal.

Understanding the provisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC) must be
grounded in the reasons for its establishment. It is therefore necessary to briefly
explore the inadequacies of domestic courts in the fight against international crime.
This will be accomplished by reference to East Timor and Cambodia.

Part III: East Timor and Cambodia

During 1975, the Indonesian army invaded the Portuguese colony of East Timor.
Between 1975 and 1999, approximately 200 000 East Timorese were murdered in
order to subjugate them to Indonesian rule.68 On 30 August 1999 the East Timorese
overwhelmingly voted overwhelmingly for independence under UN supervised
elections, as opposed to merely being granted autonomy from Indonesia. Following
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the announcement of the results during September 1999, Indonesian army-backed
militias began a campaign of murder, arson, and forced expulsions.69 During January
2000, the UN called for the establishment of an international human rights tribunal to
prosecute the heinous misdeeds committed during 1999. The Indonesian state
persuaded the UN to allow it to establish its own tribunal to prosecute these crimes.
In January 2002, Indonesia established its first human right court. At the same time,
East Timor created its own UN-backed tribunal.

As at January 2002 the East Timor tribunal, despite the frequent refusal of
Indonesia to extradite suspects, had convicted ten militiamen for crimes against
humanity.

By March 2003, the East Timor tribunal had indicted nearly 150

individuals on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity.70

By contrast, the Indonesian tribunal has demonstrated a marked lack of will and
capacity to prosecute individuals for their crimes. This is evident from the small
number of indictments and convictions as well as the trifling sentences handed down.
The Indonesian tribunal only convicted two defendants by December 2002 and it
sentenced one to three years imprisonment71 and the other to ten years72.

The

sentences pale in comparison to the heinous nature of the crimes. Furthermore, the
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effectiveness and legitimacy of the Indonesian tribunal is severely dented by
instances of witness intimidation, corruption and political pressure.73

Between 1975 and 1979 between 1.7 and 2 million Cambodians perished in
horrific circumstances at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.74 Although the Khmer
Rouge lost power in 1979, as at 2003 there had still not been any prosecutions for the
brutal murders that occurred during its reign of terror.75

Discussions between

Cambodia and the UN began during 1997 with a view to establishing a mechanism to
prosecute those responsible for the crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge. The
Cambodian government insisted on a domestic tribunal, despite UN disapproval, but
nevertheless sought UN assistance. Following disagreements over the independence
of the proposed tribunal and the status of previous amnesties a hybrid court was
agreed upon during June 2003.76 However, many of the criminals who could have
been prosecuted have passed away.

The East Timor and Cambodian situations demonstrate the enormous difficulties
of using domestic tribunals to swiftly bring international criminals to justice. On one
hand, it is necessary not to unnecessarily limit national sovereignty. On the other
hand, the prosecution venue must be guided by the need to: (a) conduct effective
prosecutions (b) hold trials that meet standards of due process (c) guarantee security
of witnesses (d) ensure that the public has access to the proceedings (e) ensure that
the proceedings create a culture for human rights and rule of law (f) ensure that
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criminals are not selectively prosecuted and (g) ensure that prosecutorial proceedings
are conducted and finalized without undue delay.

Part IV: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

At the end of the Second World War, the seeds for an international criminal court
began to germinate. These plans, stalled by the Cold War, resurfaced in 1993-4 with
the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals. The evident inadequacy of domestic courts
to deal with international crimes, coupled with the enormous financial burden of ad
hoc tribunals, led to an increasing awareness that a permanent international court was
necessary.

In July 1998, 120 nations signed the Rome Statute ushering in a new era for
international criminal law.77 By August 2003, there were 139 signatories and 91
parties to the Statute.78 The Rome Statute created the first permanent international
criminal tribunal with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and crimes against aggression. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC was
specifically not granted primacy of jurisdiction.79

Although the non bis in idem provisions are set out in article 20, this must be read
together with the complementary provision in article 17. This article precludes the
ICC from hearing a matter if it is being investigated or prosecuted by a state, unless
77

Note 68 supra, 646
Note 68 supra, 647
79
M. Zeidy “The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal
Law” 23 Mich. J. Int’l L. 869 2001-2002, 890;
78

24
the state is unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute.80 In addition, the article
provides that the ICC may not hear cases where the person concerned has already
been tried for the conduct in question by the state. This places a difficult standard of
proof on the ICC prosecutor. If the ICC displays deference to national sensitivities, it
will be relatively easy for states to deny the ICC jurisdiction by subjecting them to
sham investigation.81

Before we turn to the provisions of article 20, it is necessary to mention that the
Rome Statute prevents double punishment for the same conduct by requiring the ICC
to deduct any time previously spent in detention under an order of the ICC. In
addition, the ICC is required to deduct any time otherwise spent in detention in
connection with the conduct underlying the offence.82 Article 20 contains three
subparagraphs. Each of these will be considered separately.

Article 20(1) reads: “Except as provided for in this Statute, no person shall be
tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for
which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court” (Emphasis added).
This sub-article protects against repeated prosecutions by the ICC.

The phrase

“except as provided for in the statute” was necessary to accommodate further
prosecutions that could result from appeals and reviews under article 81, read with
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article 83(2).83 Article 20(1) refers to the conduct which formed the basis of the
crimes and is therefore a broad formulation of the non bis in idem protection. The
scope of the protection depends on whether the same facts or conduct has previously
been prosecuted by the ICC. Accordingly, the characterization of the offence and the
legal elements of the offence are irrelevant to the application of the non bis in idem
principle in the sub-article. The reference to convictions and acquittals clarifies that
the article does not prevent further prosecutions by the ICC when there has been an
amendment, withdrawal or non confirmation of charges.84

Article 20(2) provides that: “No person shall be tried by another court for a crime
referred to in article 5 for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted
by the Court” (Emphasis added).

This sub-article prevents state parties from

prosecuting persons for crimes referred to in article 5 (for instance, genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity) if they have been convicted or acquitted of those
crimes by the ICC. However, some elements of the article 5 offences constitute
independent crimes under national law (for instance, murder is an element of
genocide). Accordingly, individuals may be prosecuted for crimes under national law
even though they may have been prosecuted for the same conduct by the ICC. The
article therefore only protects defendants when states criminalize conduct within the
jurisdiction of the ICC. The negotiating parties believed this limitation of non bis in
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idem was justified because the ICC has no jurisdiction over crimes under national
law.85

It is submitted that national courts should have been expressly prohibited from
prosecuting and punishing defendants again for the same conduct after their earlier
conviction or acquittal by the ICC. The absence of such a clause does not lie in the
legal inability to include such a clause. In Tadic, for instance, the IMT indicated that
the prosecution in Germany should not proceed in respect of the same acts that were
the subject of the prosecution by the IMT. It merely reflects that states were not
ready to limit their sovereignty in such a manner as to guarantee the full protection of
non bis in idem. Of course, it is hard to defend the human rights of international
criminals.

However, human rights are universal and must also protect the

marginalized and most reviled in society.

Article 20(3) provides that: “No person who has been tried by another court for
conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect
to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:

(a)

Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or

(b)

Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance
with norms of due process recognized by international law and were
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conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice” (Emphasis added)

Article 20(3) is without doubt the most contentious of the provisions in the Rome
Statute. It first sets out the general rule, to exclude further prosecutions by the ICC in
respect of conduct already prosecuted by national courts.

The use of the word

“conduct” makes it clear that the article operates regardless of how the crimes were
characterized under national law. Then the article creates two exceptions to the
general rule: (a) where the national proceedings were a sham and (b) where the
process was not independent, impartial or otherwise not in accordance with
international standards of due process. In these exceptional circumstances, conduct
that has already prosecuted at national level may be reprosecuted by the ICC.
Because the exceptions creates supervisory jurisdiction over national courts by the
ICC, it was vigorously opposed by some states during the negotiations.86

It is unclear whether the first exception, where the national proceedings were for
the “purpose of shielding the person from criminal responsibility” for international
crimes, will be objectively or subjectively determined.

The intention of the

negotiating parties was to find a formulation that prescribed an objective test.87
Tallgren claims that good faith decisions by national prosecuting authorities to
abandon proceedings, due to the insufficiency of the evidence or because the
prosecution does not serve the interests of justice, would be sufficient to bar a second
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prosecution by the ICC. However, it is submitted that reference to word “purpose” in
sub-clause 20(3) (a) creates scope for a subjective interpretation of the article.

Implementation of the second exception, viz. where national proceedings were not
conducted independently, impartially or in accordance with international due process
norms, is likely be prove challenging for the ICC. It creates a margin of discretion for
the ICC to evaluate national proceedings against the still unclear international
standards of due process.88 As Tallgren points out, international law has “so far, if
not expressly recognized, at least quietly tolerated all kinds of extraordinary and
biased courts martial and extrajudicial solutions to large scale international crimes.”89
It is suggested that the international standards of due process encompass, at least: the
right to be presumed innocent, an open and public trial, an independent and impartial
court; the right of defendants not to be compelled to testify against themselves.90

It should be noted that article 20 does not protect against multiple criminal
prosecutions by different contracting parties. This is yet another indication of the
limited protection afforded by the non bis in idem formulation in the Rome Statute.

It should also be noted that while article 20 does not preclude the ICC from
exercising jurisdiction over the conduct of persons who have been granted amnesty
88
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via truth commissions and amnesty tribunals91 article 53 permits the prosecutor to
abandon an investigation if it would not serve the interest of justice.

Part V: Conclusion

Given that the drafters of the Rome Statute looked to the Statutes of the ICTR and
ICTY for guidance as to an appropriate formulation of non bis in idem, the significant
textual similitude is unsurprising. Somewhat predictably, the negotiating parties were
unable to reach consensus on whether the common law or civil law model of non bis
in idem would be more appropriate, which led to the adoption of a sui generis model
that borrows from both systems.92 In any event, neither the common law model nor
the civil law models are ideal.

It is both natural and inevitable that non bis in idem will vary in its scope and
application in the domestic and international environment.93 By contrast with the
national context, international criminals may be able to harness national resources for
their defense.94

The adoption of the conduct based test in article 20(1) of the Rome Statute, as
opposed to the same-elements test, must be welcomed. This is consistent with the
rationale of the non bis in idem principle and affords necessary protection for
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defendants. There is no reason why the ICC prosecutor should be afforded a second
bite at the cherry.

As previously mentioned, article 20(2) of the Rome Statute grants states the
power to prosecute defendants for national crimes outside of ICC jurisdiction.
Evaluating this article from a human rights perspective, it is apparent that this is
manifest limitation of the non bis in idem protection.

Even if the ICC has no

jurisdiction in respect of national crimes, this did not prevent the drafters from
prohibiting further prosecutions and punishment in respect of the same conduct. The
drafters’ belief that they could only limit the power of national jurisdiction in relation
to the specific crimes provided for in the Rome Statute95 does not hold up to scrutiny.

It is submitted that article 20(3) of the Rome Statute contains a legitimate
limitation of state sovereignty in the two exceptions that have been created. Firstly,
the limitations on sovereignty are narrow in scope. Secondly, national legal systems
cannot be wholly trusted to genuinely prosecute international criminals.

Grave

international crimes, such as genocide, often go hand in hand with insecure or
illegitimate domestic legal systems. Even after their fall from grace, international
criminals may be able to bring enormous pressure to bear on domestic actors thereby
decreasing the prospects of an impartial hearing. As Judge Cassese stated in Tadic:
“It would be a travesty of law and betrayal of the universal need for justice, should
the concept of state sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human
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rights.”96

The enormous obstacles to securing justice, for international crimes,

through national mechanisms are understood by the East Timorese and Cambodians.

In sum, although the non bis in idem provisions may have been framed by
necessary political compromise, certain provisions do unreasonably diminish the
protection of defendants against vexatious repeat prosecutions by state parties.
Defendants may prove their innocence at the ICC and yet face subsequent prosecution
at national level for the same conduct. In addition, it may be legitimately be argued
that the Rome Statute might have done more to advance recognition of foreign
criminal judgments between the contracting parties.
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